


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USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

# CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL



*Air University*

*Air War College*

*Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

*Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.*

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Defense News

May 12, 2003

Pg. 1

## **War Game Stuns U.S. Strategists**

*Post-Iraq Exercise Raises Fear of Preemptive WMD Strikes*

By Frank Tiboni, Carlisle, Pa.

Conventional U.S. military forces are so vastly superior to those of any potential adversaries that future foes will likely attack with conventional arms or weapons of mass destruction — either aimed at American troops in theater or citizens at home — at the outset of a conflict to blunt a U.S. assault, said military officials.

That was the stunning conclusion of Unified Quest 2003, the first major war game conducted by senior U.S. defense officials since the end of the Iraq war. Held April 27-May 1 at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa., it was sponsored by Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Norfolk, Va., and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Va.

Set in 2015, the computer-assisted exercise pitted U.S. commanders against two adversaries: a nuclear-armed Middle Eastern country surrounded by deserts, mountains and narrow waterways, and a well-armed, well-funded insurgent group threatening an allied Southeast Asian government.

The game's developers assumed that the U.S. military had retained its overwhelming superiority, and that Washington still pursued the George W. Bush Administration's policy of preemptively attacking regimes seen as threats to U.S. security.

In each scenario, enemy forces, dubbed Red and played by other Americans, were quick to use conventional weapons to keep Blue, or coalition and U.S. troops, from using seaports and airfields. They also employed weapons of mass destruction early in the battle against Blue units and civilian populations.

"Preemption is essential to Red for limiting and denying access," as is "early expansion of attack outside region and into U.S. homeland," according a briefing book on the war game distributed at a May 2 briefing at the National Defense University in Washington. At the briefing, war game supervisors discussed the game's conclusions with Paul Wolfowitz, deputy defense secretary; Joint Forces Command chief Adm. Ed Giambastiani; Gen. Eric Shinseki, Army chief of staff; Adm. Vern Clark, chief of naval operations; and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael Hagee.

Central to the game, which involved about 700 U.S. military and government personnel and a few reporters, was the concept of asymmetric warfare, in which a weaker adversary aims to counter overwhelming military superiority through unconventional means. The concept began to appear in U.S. doctrine in the mid-1990s, and Pentagon officials have become increasingly convinced no future enemy will pit its conventional forces against U.S. troops. One of the puzzles confronting American military leaders is why such tactics weren't employed by Iraq, which faced exactly the dilemma presented to the Red forces in this game.

Unified Quest comes as U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld presses the military services to generate lessons-learned studies by May 15. The studies are intended to help refine the nearly \$400 billion 2004 defense budget now being debated in Congress.

The game also will influence the goals and structure of Pinnacle Impact 2003, JFCOM's May 12-21 exercise in Norfolk that will examine joint operating concepts. Giambastiani and his team will use both games' lessons to revise ideas about how joint forces will fight during the next 15 to 20 years.

### **Red Strikes First**

The most eye-opening aspect of the war game was the speed with which their Red enemies resorted to using nuclear, biological or chemical attack against troops and civilians alike.

"Nuclear thresholds may be lower than we think them to be," said a retired Air Force four-star general who participated in the game at the seminar.

In the game, the Southeast Asian crisis exploded first on U.S. soil. The leaders of an insurgency against the pro-U.S. government lashed out after it became clear American and Australian forces would aid the Asian regime.

The insurgents helped blow up a propane tanker in New York harbor, shocking the American public and wrecking a key embarkation point for U.S. war materiel.

### **Electronic Assault**

Next, groups of hackers, who had compiled e-mail addresses belonging to deployed U.S. troops and their families, began sending fake messages to sap morale. Finally, they released the poison Ricin into their capital city, killing 41 troops and civilians and sickening many others. The poison attack drove Blue forces out of a riverine stronghold; Red also gained public support by blaming the sickness on food brought in by Blue humanitarian efforts.

Blue forces eventually triumphed after Special Forces troops hunted down and killed the rebel leader.

The war gamers played three versions of the Mideast crisis, so they could try out different Blue command structures. None of the Red teams communicated with each other during the exercise, nor did the Blue teams. Still, each version played out in remarkably similar ways. In each, Red forces struck early, seizing what advantage they could. In at least one version, Red forces set oil fields ablaze to inflict economic pressure. In another, Red set off weapons of mass destruction in a seaport, slowing U.S. forces' buildup in the region. All three mined nearby waterways and deployed anti-ship missiles to threaten tankers and troop ships.

Later, the Red teams attempted to drag other countries and world opinion into the war as distractions for Washington.

### **Mideast Goes Nuclear**

Most dramatically, all three Red teams reached for nuclear weapons as their defeat became all but certain.

One team detonated a device near a U.S. military stronghold on the territory of the Mideast country — an echo of 1960s U.S. doctrine against an overwhelming conventional Warsaw Pact force. Another placed its bomb amid oilfields to blackmail the world into supporting its regime.

The third smuggled a bomb into a neighboring country — an ally of Washington — and demanded its government cease its support of U.S. forces. After the neighbor complied, the Red team tried to repeat the tactic by shipping the bomb to Paris. French authorities seized the device on the city's outskirts, and the Mideast government fell soon afterward.

Each team used its nukes for different effect: military, economic and political; and only one actually sought to cause mass casualties.

"There may be an apocalyptic leader out there who wants to kill a lot of Blue in a last-gasp measure. But that's not what we did, and I don't subscribe to that notion," said Richard Hart Sinnreich, a retired Army officer and war gaming consultant who commanded one of the Red forces in the war game. "What we did was use weapons of mass destruction materially to improve our position."

A Washington-based analyst unconnected with the war game noted that weapons of mass destruction are difficult to make and to use, and therefore serve better as deterrents than wartime arms.

"It is difficult to employ them to achieve limited tactical objectives, even if all of the barriers to manufacture, weaponization, deployment and delivery can be overcome," said Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists.

But the game shows the conundrum that an adversary's use of nuclear arms will pose: If the United States hits back in kind, world opinion is likely to coalesce against the world's remaining superpower. But if Washington chooses not to strike, other nations may read this lesson: A nuclear weapon is the best advantage they can buy.

### **Preparing for Future War**

The long buildup time for U.S. and coalition forces in Iraqi Freedom and Desert Storm will likely not be afforded again, according to a top Army doctrine official who helped oversee the war game.

Others, citing the asymmetrical benefits of weapons of mass destruction, believe potential U.S. adversaries will focus their procurement efforts on making them and their delivery systems.

The war game supervisors concluded the United States ought to buy shallow-draft, high-speed ships; heavy-lift and short-runway vertical-takeoff-and-landing cargo planes; and missile defenses.

They also should work to jam-proof their satellites and secure military and civilian computers and networks.

Enemies will seek ways to interrupt communications around the world: U.S. military and commercial satellites and networks as well as other friendly or even neutral systems. They will try to hack into satellites, blind them with lasers or shoot them down.

U.S. commanders may not be able to respond in kind. Destroying a satellite being used by a terrorist group could devastate the entire region's information infrastructure.

The game emphasized the importance of choosing nearby port and airfield alternatives, buying cargo vehicles to reach them, and building relationships with their governments ahead of any crisis.

"Relationships count," war game overseers wrote in the briefing book. "Distance and time are tyrannical and affect the joint force commander's options."

Few 21st century conflicts will be strictly regional, they wrote: "They all have global impacts."

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New York Times

May 13, 2003

## **Terror Scenes Follow Script Of Never Again**

By Sarah Kershaw

SEATTLE, May 12 — The plot went like this: A sinister terrorist organization called Glodo, working from a safe house in Washington State, hatches a scheme to detonate a dirty bomb packed with radioactive agents in an industrial corner of South Seattle. At least 150 people are killed or critically injured. Plumes of toxic smoke fill the air for miles.

The plot was put into action today as a carefully scripted terrorism drill turned a vacant lot next to a coffee roasting plant into what looked like the set of a low-budget action film. It was part of the most extensive terrorism response training exercise in the nation's history.

The drill, which began about noon with an explosion that was quickly followed by sirens and the piercing screams of actors playing victims, is part of a weeklong exercise involving simulated chemical and biological attacks on Seattle and Chicago.

Organized by the Department of Homeland Security at a cost of \$16 million, the events are part of the first such drill since the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, and follow a similar but much smaller-scale exercise in 2000. The Seattle scene today, which began with what sounded like a loud display of fireworks, was complete with a fake news crew, running around frantically in the debris in search of wrenching rescue dramas as emergency workers in gas masks and protective biochemical suits rushed into the wreckage and onto overturned city buses.

According to the script, the attack would be followed only a day later by the location of the terrorist safe house in Washington. That same day, Tuesday, the script called for Glodo to set off a covert biological attack on Chicago, sending residents to hospitals with flulike symptoms consistent with pneumonic plague.

Both Chicago and Seattle volunteered for the drills, and federal officials said today that the government had decided to pick one West Coast city and one city in the middle of the country, both vulnerable to terrorist attacks because they are major urban centers.

"Seattle and Chicago are among the top urban areas we're concerned about," said Michael F. Byrne, director of the Office of National Capital Region Coordination for the Department of Homeland Security, a retired New York City Fire Department captain with experience in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993 and 2001.

Seattle, with a population of about 563,000, major ports, large companies like Microsoft and the landmark Space Needle, and its proximity to oil refineries and hydroelectric plants in the state, is an alluring terrorist target, officials said. But law enforcement officials emphasized there were no credible terrorist threats to the area.

"This is an important day for Seattle and for our country," said Mayor Greg Nickels, saying he expected other cities, even much larger ones like New York, to learn from the drill. "We are working hard toward achieving the goal of being the most prepared city in the country." Adding that "homeland security begins at home," he said, "When a disaster occurs, people do not call the White House, they call 911."

The dozens of federal, state and local agencies involved in the drill spent 18 months preparing for this week's exercises, which will involve 8,500 medical, police, fire, rescue and other personnel across the country, officials said. As soon as the bomb was to detonate, Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia were to activate their response systems and go into a Code Red emergency alert.

In the nation's capital, a group of senior administration officials — led by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, playing himself — organized the response to the fake attack in Seattle. Mr. Ridge, who spent most of the day participating in the exercise from his offices in Washington, oversaw meetings to discuss intelligence suggesting that the fictional terrorist group was behind the attack in Seattle and might have smuggled other weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

He telephoned Seattle's mayor and the state's governor, and he organized a classified videoconference with other members of the Homeland Security Council. Officials said that Mr. Ridge was the highest-ranking member of the administration to take part in the exercise. Stand-ins portrayed other senior officials, including President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.

Simultaneously, Chicago area hospitals began receiving faxes about a patient who had checked into one of the hospitals with a mysterious ailment. The next day, "a growing number of patients show up at hospitals in the Chicago region suffering from flulike symptoms, including cough and fever," according to the script, and federal health officials soon determine that the city has been attacked with a biological agent.

"You want to stress your system," said Linda Sacia, a spokeswoman for the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Chicago. "You don't want to react to just one disaster."

In Seattle, law enforcement officials on the scene of the fake explosion said the response by firefighters and other rescue workers wearing gas masks was going smoothly.

As they spoke, firefighters in protective chemical suits milled through the scene, a supposed street corner, where overturned buses, police cars and fire engines could be seen, fake victims wandered in a daze, car fires smoldered and a few news helicopters flew overhead. The "casualties" were taken to a nearby hospital.

Federal officials said the exercise in 2000 pointed to breakdowns in communication among agencies. And examinations of the response to the real terrorist attack of Sept. 11 in New York City have revealed serious communication problems between police and fire officials.

Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer of the Seattle police spoke to reporters at the scene about two hours into the exercise and rated the overall response as a "solid B." "It's my estimation that we're very much on target," he said.

But he added that even with all the preparation for the exercise there were still weaknesses, although officials said at a post-drill briefing tonight that they were still analyzing the exercise and could not say specifically what went wrong. "The communication capacity is always limited," he said. "And that's a national problem."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/international/worldspecial/13DRIL.html>

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New York Times

May 13, 2003

## Dogs Take Their Place In Arsenal Against Chemical Attack

By Philip Shenon

WASHINGTON, May 12 — In the hunt for terrorists who might try to use unconventional weapons on American soil, the federal government is enlisting an old, and very trusted, ally.

The Department of Homeland Security says that in a research program kept quiet for months, it has determined, apparently for the first time, that ordinary dogs can be trained to sniff out trace amounts of the nonlethal components of chemical weapons, including sarin and cyanide.

As a result, the department's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has begun to train a corps of so-called chemical detector dogs and is planning to deploy them at airports, seaports, government buildings and other potential terrorist targets, where they will work alongside the police dogs that have long been used to sniff out narcotics, explosives and human remains.

So far, several dogs — the department will not give an exact number, saying that to do so would tip off terrorists to the scope of the program — have been given chemical training at Fort McClellan, Ala. Hundreds more are expected to be added to the program in the next two years.

The department is studying whether dogs may also be effective in the search for biological weapons, although officials are less optimistic about the program's usefulness in this area, since many germ agents have no distinctive odor.

The discovery that dogs can apparently detect components of chemical weapons has implications beyond national security. Officials hope it will also mean budget savings for the federal government, which now spends hundreds of millions of dollars a year on research to develop machinery to detect chemical weapons. Given the initial results of the new program, officials say, some of that high-tech detection equipment may prove no more sensitive than a dog's snout.

The work with the dogs is "very promising," said Robert C. Bonner, the commissioner of customs and border protection, who championed the program and helped find \$2 million in the budget to get it started.

"After 9/11, and with the continuing terrorist threat, we began asking the question of how we could improve our capability against terrorist weapons, specifically against weapons of mass destruction," Mr. Bonner said. "And there had been some initial research that suggested that canines might be effective with chemicals."

Dogs, he said, provide "portability, and they also allow you to detect chemical weapons before they are released." Officials say they have kept quiet about the program until now because they did not want to raise hopes about its usefulness prematurely, or alert terrorists that the government might soon have a new defense against chemical attack.

Animal researchers and other scientists say they are not surprised by dogs' ability to detect the components of chemical weapons. The Pentagon has long used dogs for chemical detection, most recently in Iraq, where they helped in the search for traditional weapons and explosives.

"Dogs can detect compounds that the human nose could never pick up at the same concentration: the concentration can be a hundred- or a thousand-fold weaker," said Charles J. Wysocki, a neuroscientist at the Monell Chemical Senses Center, a research institute in Philadelphia.

"Conceptually, there's no difference between training a dog to find an explosive material that has a residual odor to it and training a dog to detect a chemical weapon that has a residual odor," Dr. Wysocki said.

Jim Watson, a veteran dog trainer who is secretary of the North American Police Work Dog Association, said he knew of no previous research on dogs and chemical weapons. "But when it comes to training dogs to smell something," he said, "the sky's the limit."

Officials with the Homeland Security Department said the training program began last October, after federal laboratories identified a group of chemicals that, though used to make sarin and other chemical weapons, were harmless by themselves and could be detected by dogs in trace amounts. "The idea is this: If I'm looking for a Big

Mac and I know that Big Macs are deadly, I'm looking for the special sauce that is not lethal," said Lee T. Titus, director of the canine enforcement program for the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.

The dogs in the initial training program were chosen from three breeds especially talented at detection work and easy to train: Labrador retrievers, German shepherds and Belgian Malinois, which resemble shepherds.

All the dogs were new to detection work; the Homeland Security Department said it had decided not to shift over any of its existing narcotics- or explosives-detection dogs because this task was so different. A narcotics dog, for example, is taught to bite and scratch at the source of contraband. But that could be deadly for a chemical-detection dog and its handler if the dog came upon chemical weapons.

So a dog in the chemical-detection program is taught to alert its handler by some signal like snapping its head back or perking up its ears, and then by sitting in place.

Mr. Titus said that while the first dogs used in the program had been bought from breeders, he planned to select most of the animals in the future from public dog pounds, the source of almost 80 percent of the animals his office trains for other detection work. "It's an extra benefit," he said. "I can save some really good dogs from the pound."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/13/international/worldspecial/13HOME.html>

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Los Angeles Times

May 14, 2003

## **Trailer May Support Bioweapons Claims**

*Specialists are confident inspections will show its intended use was to make illicit agents.*

By Carol J. Williams, Times Staff Writer

MOSUL, Iraq — U.S. military specialists who have examined a looted trailer equipped with chemical vats and compressors believe with "a reasonable degree of certainty" that the crude equipment was a mobile biological weapons laboratory, the commander of U.S. forces in northern Iraq said Tuesday.

The trailer — listing and shorn of its tarpaulin covers, tires, hoses and other accessible parts — was found last week. It stands at the edge of the Al Kindi Weapons Research and Development compound awaiting inspection by experts en route from the United States, said Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Army's 101st Airborne Division. Petraeus' forces previously have announced discoveries that might confirm U.S. claims that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's regime was developing weapons of mass destruction — only to find that the items were conventional weapons or chemical compounds commonly used for peaceful purposes.

This time, the general is hopeful that inspections will produce long-sought evidence supporting Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's assertions to the U.N. Security Council last fall that Iraq was poised to expose its enemies to poison gas or biological agents.

"What we'd love to find is some compound that would prove the smoking gun," Petraeus said of the trailer.

Civil affairs experts who have examined the trailer said they were fairly certain it was designed to produce biological agents on the run, to stay ahead of U.N. weapons inspectors who were in the country until a few days before the U.S.-led war began in March. But Petraeus conceded that looting might deprive investigators of proof. It was also unclear whether the apparently unfinished facility had ever been used, he said.

What remains of the trailer teeters on tireless wheels in a gravel lot near the weapons compound. The only major equipment still inside includes a stainless steel boiler, a vat and a compressor bolted to the floor. A placard reads, in English: "Al-Iraq Factory for production of Safety Valves of Compressors."

"We call this guy R2D2," said Army Spc. Erick Corrales, pointing to a robot-like boiler too heavy for looters to steal. The Los Angeles native is one of two dozen soldiers patrolling the site.

The stripped trailer is identical to one found two weeks ago near Irbil, 50 miles east of Mosul and just inside an autonomous zone controlled by ethnic Kurds. The vehicles' serial numbers suggested that the Irbil trailer was the first of a production line and that the Mosul vehicle was the second, Petraeus said.

Meanwhile, an Iraqi weapons engineer who worked at Al Kindi warned that the facility's 950 now-unemployed specialists were easy prey for terrorists or rogue nations keen on hiring weapons technology know-how.

Shaheen Ali Dahir, who said he worked in the "intelligent weapons" sector, added that he approached U.S. forces with a proposal to form a civil engineering brigade from the idled experts.

"These people need to be in other work, reconstructing the country," he said. "I worry that if someone comes along and offers them something, they will take it just so they can feed their families."

He met early Tuesday with officers of the 101st Airborne to propose a diversionary program like that initiated in the mid-1990s when numerous Russian scientists with weapons expertise were being hired by Iran, Libya and other countries.

Shaheen suggested that the bombed buildings of the Al Kindi facility should be rebuilt by U.S. forces so the specialists can retain their place of work.

That would be a tall order: The site is a veritable wasteland, where looters carted off what was left after repeated airstrikes by U.S.-led forces. Three of the facility's six buildings were destroyed — one by a "bunker-buster" bomb that broke up the foot-thick concrete floor and sprayed pieces hundreds of feet away.

Petraeus brushed off the engineer's proposals.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-war-biolab14may14.1.3004646.story?coll=la%2Dheadlines%2Dworld>

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New York Times

May 14, 2003

## **U.S. General Unsure When Or If Weapons Were Destroyed**

By New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 13 — An Army general in northern Iraq said today that Saddam Hussein's government might have destroyed stocks of chemical weapons some time before the United States attacked Iraq to topple Mr. Hussein. But Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, said it was still too early to determine definitively the location or status of Iraq's suspected arsenal of unconventional weapons.

"There's no question that there were chemical weapons years ago," General Petraeus said, speaking to reporters at the Pentagon by videophone from Mosul. "I just don't know whether it was all destroyed years ago."

General Petraeus said he did not know "whether they were destroyed right before the war," or "whether they're still hidden."

Military teams have scoured dozens of suspected weapons sites, but have not discovered illicit arms.

Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the commander of allied forces in Iraq, has said teams may ultimately have to search several thousand sites to find evidence of such weapons.

General Petraeus, however, did offer new details about a suspected mobile biological weapons laboratory that he said was found May 9 at Al Kindi, a military research center near Mosul.

"Our own chemical section looked at the trailer and confirmed it as a trailer that was very close to identical to the first trailer that was found by Special Forces southeast of here last week," General Petraeus said.

American teams have now located parts of three mobile labs, military and civilian officials say.

General Petraeus said, however, that the trailer found at Al Kindi was not completed.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/14/international/worldspecial/14PENT.html>

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Wall Street Journal

May 14, 2003

## **Shut Down North Korea's Nuclear Wal-Mart**

By Samuel R. Berger and Robert L. Gallucci

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's summit with President Bush today provides a critical opportunity to reconcile divergent perspectives on the most serious nuclear threat we have faced since the Cuban missile crisis.

America's response has been dangerously confused, while South Korea's posture elevates hope over history.

If Presidents Bush and Roh do not come together on a clear, firm strategy, the world will have its first nuclear-weapons Wal-Mart -- an easy access marketplace for terrorists to obtain nuclear weapons. That is not a world we want to live in or leave to our children.

Why is this situation so ominous? North Korea has had a nuclear program since the 1980s. Some time late in that period, they produced enough plutonium for two bombs, which they now claim to possess. In 1991, the first Bush administration succeeded in getting North Korea to accept international inspections under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those inspections challenged the North to account for all its past plutonium, which it eventually failed to do. In 1993, under the Clinton administration, Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT, and later

said it planned to remove 8,000 used fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and separate enough plutonium to produce more nuclear weapons.

The Clinton administration immediately said this was unacceptable to the U.S. We made clear to the North that reprocessing this plutonium was a line it should not cross. We painstakingly developed a common position with the South Koreans: to seek multilateral economic sanctions against North Korea in the United Nations. The North declared that would be an "act of war." We then began, together with our South Korean allies, to reinforce our defensive military posture in the South. The president was poised to send additional U.S. troops. And the Pentagon quietly examined offensive military options to deal with the plutonium complex, although those had not been presented formally to the president when the North agreed to negotiations.

With our red line in place, and with full recognition of the seriousness of that decision, we entered into those negotiations -- for 14 months -- the only precondition being that no action could be taken by the North to move ahead with plutonium production while negotiations proceeded. Those negotiations produced the 1994 Agreed Framework, which stopped the plutonium program, including construction under way on two larger reactors, under strict international supervision.

It is apparent that the Agreed Framework has broken down. In October of last year the North acknowledged that some time earlier it had secretly started an alternative program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Since then, it has thrown out the international supervisors, pulled out of the NPT, restarted its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon and claimed that it already, in fact, is separating plutonium from those 8,000 rods that had been sealed over the last eight years. If the North proceeds with reprocessing, it could produce enough plutonium for six additional bombs in six months; if it resumes construction of the two uncompleted nuclear reactors, in a few years it could be producing enough plutonium for roughly 30 bombs a year -- or the bombs themselves.

But it is the differences from '93-'94 that are most frightening. First, terror groups like al Qaeda have emerged that are in the market for nuclear weapons. North Korea, the world's greatest proliferator, is not likely to have any compunction against selling its only real cash crop. And these groups will have no compunction in using them -- whether it is Chechens in Red Square or anti-Western jihadists in Trafalgar Square, the Place de la Concorde, the Mall in Washington or in the Mall of America. Second, we no longer stand side-by-side with our regional partners. Many South Koreans now believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that the North Korean nuclear program is not a threat against them but a response by North Korea to a threat it perceives from us.

The options now all are bad. The Bush administration's position appears to be that we recognize the fact that the North may continue making plutonium; we will try to stop them from transferring it outside the country (all you need to know is that plutonium for several nuclear weapons would fit in a breadbox); and we will increase pressure on the North by shutting down its heroin trade (presumably based on the success that a series of administrations have had in shutting down cocaine traffic from South America). This apparently is designed to collapse the North Korean regime, no mean feat for an economy that survives about two inches off the ground.

What is the alternative? First, it involves a recognition that a nuclear weapons factory in North Korea, in a world of global terrorists, is not a situation we can tolerate. Second, it requires that we stop characterizing negotiations as succumbing to blackmail, decide what it is we most need (a verifiable end to its nuclear weapons and missile programs, involving intrusive international inspections nationwide) and then negotiate seriously. That said, a satisfactory agreement may not be achievable. The North already may have decided to pursue the nuclear-weapons track. But if we do not test this in good faith, we will not have any chance of support from South Korea, Japan or China for more coercive options.

Third, we must make clear that further separation of plutonium by the North will result in serious consequences, with all options, including military, on the table. This is the hardest part because the possibility of war here is not Iraq redux; it could be the Korean War redux.

President Bush's goal at today's summit should be to convince President Roh, first, that we are serious about negotiations and, second, that we must stand together if it is clear the North is bent on the nuclear track. Only if we are prepared to say "yes" to a good agreement -- and are ready for the consequences of "no" -- do we have the prospect of stopping the nuclear Wal-Mart before it opens.

*Mr. Berger, chairman of Stonebridge International, was national security adviser from 1997-2001. Mr. Gallucci, dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, was assistant secretary of state in the first Bush and Clinton administrations.*

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Washington Times  
May 15, 2003  
Pg. 1

## North Korea Gets Stern Warning

By Joseph Curl, The Washington Times

President Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun vowed yesterday that they "will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea" and threatened the use of "further steps" to deal with the Stalinist regime's nuclear ambitions.

Standing shoulder to shoulder in the White House Rose Garden, the two leaders pledged to work toward a peaceful solution to the standoff with Pyongyang, which continues its bellicose rhetoric against its neighbor and the United States.

"I assured the president we will continue to work to achieve a peaceful solution," Mr. Bush said. "We're making good progress toward achieving that peaceful resolution of the issue of the Korean Peninsula in regards to North Korea."

Still, the two leaders said in a joint communique after their 45-minute Oval Office meeting "that increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps," although they "expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved."

White House officials last night would not elaborate on the meaning of "further steps."

The statement was more explicitly aggressive than what Mr. Roh had said in an interview in Seoul last week with The Washington Times.

Before leaving the peninsula, Mr. Roh said he would call for Mr. Bush to use only peaceful means to disarm North Korea, exempting it from the U.S. doctrine of pre-emptive attacks on rogue states developing weapons of mass destruction.

"I would like to discuss with President Bush that the circumstances on the Korean Peninsula may not be appropriate for applying this principle from the very beginning," Mr. Roh told The Times. "The mere thought of a military conflict with North Korea is a calamity for us."

But a senior administration official said Mr. Roh "never asked" Mr. Bush to rule out the military option.

"You can't take options off the table," a senior administration official said after the appearance by the two leaders. In their statement, the two "noted with serious concern North Korea's statements about reprocessing, possession of nuclear weapons, and its threat to demonstrate or transfer these weapons."

"They stressed that escalatory moves by North Korea will only lead to its greater isolation and a more desperate situation in the North. Both leaders reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation," the communique said.

The Oval Office meeting was the first between Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh and marked the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Mr. Bush had a notably cool relationship with Mr. Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae-jung, but he appeared to enjoy Mr. Roh's company.

"I have found the president to be an easy man to talk to," said Mr. Bush, who likes to use his meetings with foreign leaders to size up their characters and often makes clear whether they have connected or whether they remain distant.

"He expresses his opinion very clearly, and he's easy to understand. One thing is for certain, we will work to have the best possible relations between our countries, and it's based upon close consultation on a wide variety of issues," he said.

Before a dinner at the White House residence, Mr. Bush took Mr. Roh, a huge fan of Abraham Lincoln and author of a book on the 16th president, on a tour, including a stop at the Lincoln Bedroom.

Mr. Bush also showed Mr. Roh one of the original copies of the Gettysburg Address, as well as a copy of the Emancipation Proclamation.

Mr. Roh, 56, expressed his own connection with Mr. Bush, also 56.

"In a very short period of time, we have smoothly reached an agreement. It was not even necessary to tell President Bush all the logic that I had in mind to convince him before I came here. President Bush had an accurate idea of what concerned me and what were my hopes. And I second what President Bush has just stated," the Korean leader said in the brief Rose Garden appearance before reporters.

Mr. Roh sought to use his first U.S. visit, which also included trips to Wall Street and the Lincoln Memorial, to dissuade Mr. Bush of impressions that he is anti-American. The effort was a hard sell, given how Mr. Roh capitalized on anti-U.S. demonstrations in South Korea in his election campaign last year.

But on his trip here, the new leader quickly staked out a tough position on North Korea. On Tuesday, he said, "North Korea must give up its nuclear program without fail so it can become a responsible member of the international community."

Before meeting Mr. Bush, Mr. Roh met with Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. In his meeting with Mr. Cheney, the two discussed the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops along the demilitarized zone between the Koreas.

"American forces were important in the past and are important now," Mr. Roh said after his lunch with Mr. Cheney, according to a South Korean statement. The vice president "said U.S. troops should stay in South Korea because they guarantee security in the region," it said.

But the two countries agreed to pull U.S. troops out of the garrison at the Seoul suburb of Yongsan in an effort to consolidate American forces now scattered over about 100 camps and bases across South Korea.

Before the talks, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice made clear there would be no softening of the administration's line toward Pyongyang.

"Our policy toward North Korea can really be summed up as follows: No one should be willing to give in to the kind of blackmail that the North Koreans have been practicing on the world for a number of years now, especially not the United States," she said.

But Miss Rice did say Washington had not ruled out entering new talks with the communist state, despite what she called North Korean posturing at a three-way encounter, also involving China, in Beijing last month.

"That is not the spirit in which we would expect to conduct any further talks, but we are not fearful of talks, and if we believe that they are useful at some point in time, we would be more than willing to re-enter them."

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20030515-13705392.htm>

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Washington Post  
May 15, 2003  
Pg. 22

## **Iran Said To Be Producing Bioweapons**

*Opposition Group Names Anthrax as First of Six Pathogens in Intensive Effort*

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

Iran has begun production of weaponized anthrax and is actively working with at least five other pathogens, including smallpox, in a drive to build an arsenal of biological weapons, according to an opposition group that previously exposed a secret nuclear enrichment program in the country.

The group, Mujaheddin-e Khalq, citing informants inside the Iranian government, says the anthrax weapons are the first fruits of a program begun secretly in 2001 to triple the size of Iran's biowarfare program. The push for new biological weapons was launched in parallel with a more ambitious campaign to build massive nuclear facilities capable of producing components for nuclear bombs, said officials of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political arm of the Mujaheddin, which seeks the overthrow of the Iranian government.

"We can say with certainty that the Iranian regime now has the capability of mass production of biological material for weapons use," Alireza Jafarzadeh, the council's U.S. representative, said in an interview. The group has scheduled a news conference today in Washington to release more details.

Although many weapons experts believe Iran maintains at least a rudimentary biological weapons program, few details are known. The CIA, in an unclassified report released this year, said Iran "probably" maintains an offensive biological weapons program and likely "has capabilities to produce small quantities" of biological agents.

The opposition group's claims, if true, would suggest that Iran's pursuit of biological weapons is more aggressive than previously believed.

The Mujaheddin-e Khalq, also known as the People's Mujaheddin, is listed by the State Department as a terrorist group, though weapons experts and intelligence officials say many of the group's past claims about Iranian weapons programs have been largely reliable. The group first exposed a massive nuclear facility built near the town of Natanz to make enriched uranium, which can be used for commercial nuclear power plants or to make nuclear weapons.

In recent weeks, the Mujaheddin has been fighting for survival after some of its Iraq-based military camps came under attack by U.S. forces during the war. Although the Mujaheddin claimed neutrality in the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq, the Bush administration decided to bomb Mujaheddin bases in an apparent attempt to thaw relations with Iran. Later, U.S. Central Command arranged a cease-fire that allowed the group to keep many of its weapons and maintain its camps. But then the Bush administration decided to actively seek its surrender.

Mujaheddin officials said the timing of the release of their report on Iran's biowarfare program was unrelated to their problems with the U.S. government. Jafarzadeh, the spokesman, said the Mujaheddin had been gathering information about the program for months and had received critical new details from inside the Iranian government within the past few days.

The expansion of Iran's biological weapons program was spelled out in a four-page document called the "Comprehensive National Microbial Defense Plan," which was approved by Iran's Supreme National Security Council in 2001, Jafarzadeh said. The plan called for a tripling of the country's bioweapons production capacity by 2003, and divided responsibilities across a network of research facilities linked to Iran's armed forces or Revolutionary Guard.

Among the pathogens being weaponized under the plan were anthrax, aflatoxin, typhus, smallpox, plague and cholera, Jafarzadeh said. Mujaheddin officials were unable to produce hard evidence to support the claim, but they described specific research facilities and named individual scientists who were placed in charge of the effort. Jafarzadeh said experts were recruited from several countries, including North Korea, Russia, China and India, to assist the effort.

"The report about smallpox was very carefully assessed and verified," Jafarzadeh said.

No nation is known to have produced smallpox weapons other than the Soviet Union, which destroyed its stocks in the early 1990s. Although various reports have suggested that other nations experimented with smallpox -- most notably North Korea and Iraq -- the claims have never been verified.

Weapons experts reacted cautiously to the group's claims, especially the report about smallpox. But several said the group's description of Iran's bioweapons program seemed plausible.

"It can't be dismissed out of hand," said William Potter, director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "There is no doubt the Iranians have been very interested in such weapons. We know they left their calling cards at various institutes in the former Soviet Union seeking to recruit experts in the field."

David Albright, a nuclear weapons expert and former member of a U.N. nuclear weapons inspection team in Iraq, said he could not verify the claims but said the group provided solid leads in the past. "Often their information is correct, in part because they have reliable human sources well placed in the Iranian government," Albright said.

"And they release information that you can check -- information that is actionable."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57442-2003May14.html>

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New York Times  
May 15, 2003

## **Panel Rejects Nuclear Arms Of Small Yield**

By James Dao

WASHINGTON, May 14 — A proposal by the Bush administration to allow development of new kinds of small nuclear weapons has been rejected by the Republican-controlled House Armed Services Committee.

In a voice vote held Tuesday night, the committee approved a Democratic measure retaining a 10-year-old ban on the development of nuclear weapons with explosive force of less than five kilotons of TNT. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was about 15 kilotons.

The Bush administration had pressed for repeal of the ban, known as the Spratt-Furse amendment, arguing that the prohibition has had a chilling affect on scientific research related to nuclear weapons.

In a compromise reached between Representative Curt Weldon, a Republican from Pennsylvania, and Representative John Spratt, a South Carolina Democrat who was an author of the original ban, the Armed Services Committee approved a measure to allow research into low-yield nuclear weapons.

But the measure maintains the prohibition on development, production and acquisition of low-yield nuclear weapons. The provision is part of the 2004 Defense Authorization bill that is expected to reach the House floor later this month.

"The action in the House sends an important message: that the United States is not backsliding towards development of new battlefield nuclear weapons," Mr. Spratt said in a statement.

Last week, a sharply divided Senate Armed Services Committee voted to repeal the ban. Democrats have vowed to fight to maintain the ban on the Senate floor next week.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/15/international/15NUKE.html>

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Washington Post

May 15, 2003

Pg. 2

## President Sees 'Progress' On N. Korea

*Bush Won't Rule Out Military Action; Pact Reached With S. Korea on Base*

By Dana Milbank and Karen DeYoung, Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush, meeting yesterday with South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, announced "good progress" toward a resolution of the standoff over North Korea's nuclear ambitions but would not forswear the possibility of military action to keep the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

The two leaders, in meetings at the White House, agreed to arrange a plan for restructuring U.S. forces in South Korea that would produce a major consolidation -- and possibly reduction -- of the 36,000 U.S. troops there. The administration agreed to close a major military base near downtown Seoul; the 6,000-strong Yongsan, the focus of much of the anti-American tension in South Korea in the past, will be shuttered at an "early date," the leaders said. The decision to move ahead with a U.S. military consolidation in South Korea indicated that despite the standoff over North Korea's moves to breach arms agreements and restart its nuclear program, the administration is willing to close bases -- even those near the demilitarized zone. Roh's government had worried that such an action in the face of the North Korean nuclear threat could destabilize South Korea's economy and security.

"We are not going to freeze in place until the nuclear issue is solved, and the South Koreans know that and they agree," a senior Bush official said last night.

Roh had come to Washington with hopes the United States would rule out a military strike and hold off on a reshuffling of its troop presence. The administration did not grant either request but agreed to assurances that it would consult closely with South Korea in all cases. The two leaders issued a joint statement saying that increasing "threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps," without specifying steps.

Bush and Roh defused -- at least temporarily -- a disagreement over whether a military strike against North Korea would be contemplated. The administration would not rule out a military attack -- a senior Bush aide said Roh did not make such a request -- but the two leaders expressed "confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved." Bush and Roh said in their statement that they "will not tolerate nuclear weapons" in North Korea. "Both leaders reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation," the statement said.

But in an unexpected note of optimism about the nettlesome nuclear dispute, Bush spoke hopefully of a peaceful solution. "We're making good progress toward achieving that peaceful resolution," he said in a seven-minute Rose Garden appearance last evening with Roh.

Roh received an affirmation that U.S. troops would be kept in South Korea, but no public statement of how many. While protests in South Korea against the American presence have waned, Pentagon officials have discussed moving some of those troops elsewhere.

After Bush's meeting, a senior administration official said there was no decision on the ultimate number of U.S. troops in South Korea, but "it's possible the numbers could be lower." The official said that this would not reduce U.S. military capability in the region, but that it made no sense "to have these bases scattered about the country." "[T]he two leaders agreed to work out plans to consolidate U.S. forces around key hubs," the joint statement said, agreeing that "relocation of U.S. bases north of the Han River should be pursued" and praising the "expanding" role of South Korean defense forces.

The latest tensions with North Korea began in October, when the administration said North Korea had admitted it had a nuclear weapons program, violating a 1994 treaty reached by the Clinton administration. At discussions in Beijing last month, North Korea suggested it would give up its nuclear program if it were granted more economic aid -- but the country warned that it had nuclear weapons and was willing to use them.

Pyongyang continued its confrontational rhetoric yesterday, accusing the United States of a "trite trick" for including North Korea on a list of state sponsors of terrorism issued April 30 by the State Department.

But Bush and his aides sounded increasingly optimistic yesterday about a peaceful resolution. For the first time, a senior administration official briefing reporters after Bush's meeting with Roh said last month's talks in Beijing were a "big success." Bush will meet next week with the Japanese prime minister and next month with the Russian and Chinese leaders to plot a course.

Outside experts have criticized the administration for failing to focus on a threat they view as far greater than the one posed by Iraq. "Either the North Koreans are almost finished reprocessing" stored plutonium or "about to start reprocessing," said Robert L. Gallucci, an arms control expert who negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea for the Clinton administration. "This is a country . . . that has said it is prepared to sell [weapons] on the open market. This is really bad."

Gallucci, dean of Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service, said there was little indication that the administration had "resolved its internal differences" and agreed on a "strategy to deal with the threat to our national security and that of our internal allies."

Roh's meetings with Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and some lawmakers came as Reuters reported from Beijing that a number of North Korean military officials have defected to South Korea and the West. White House press secretary Ari Fleischer said he could not confirm the report, "but it would not be surprising."

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A57104-2003May14.html>

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New York Times  
May 15, 2003

## **Bush And South Korean President Are Vague On North Korea Strategy**

By David E. Sanger

WASHINGTON, May 14 — President Bush and South Korea's new president, Roh Moo Hyun, emerged tonight from their first meeting declaring that the two countries "will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea." But in a series of vague diplomatic statements they stepped around serious differences about whether to isolate the country with an economic embargo or threaten it with a military strike.

Appearing in the Rose Garden this evening, the two men said they had developed a quick friendship that would aid them in one of the tensest standoffs in the region in decades. In sharp contrast to the kind of language he used about Iraq and Saddam Hussein when foreign leaders visited him earlier this year, Mr. Bush did not publicly demand today that North Korea open itself up to inspections or stop producing bomb-grade material, and he never uttered the name of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il.

"We're making good progress toward achieving that peaceful resolution of the issue of the Korean Peninsula in regards to North Korea," Mr. Bush said as he and Mr. Roh, a former human rights lawyer and legislator, talked briefly to reporters.

They did not take questions and did not specify what kind of progress Mr. Bush was referring to.

On Monday, North Korea said it had "nullified" an agreement with South Korea committing to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. But the statements fit a White House strategy, aides said, of playing down the North Korean threat, and demonstrating to Mr. Kim that the United States would not give in to what Mr. Bush recently called blackmail.

Nonetheless, the differences in strategy were clearly evident today.

This morning, in an advertisement paid for by the South Korean government, Mr. Roh was described as seeking American agreement to "rule out a military option" in confronting the North, a reference to the Pentagon's longtime contingency plan to knock out the North Korean nuclear complex at Yongbyon.

But today both the national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and the White House spokesman, Ari Fleischer, said it would be unwise to rule out the use of military force, even while pursuing a peaceful resolution of the problem.

"No one should be willing to give in to the kind of blackmail that the North Koreans have been practicing on the world for a number of years now, especially not the United States," Ms. Rice told reporters today.

She said the president reserved all his military options, though she added that Mr. Bush might be willing to engage in another round of negotiations with the North Koreans, after a meeting in Beijing last month in which the North declared that it already possessed weapons, and had turned 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into bomb-grade plutonium.

"We are not fearful of talks, and if we believe that they are useful at some point in time we would be more than willing to re-enter them," Ms. Rice said.

Mr. Roh said on Monday that he would seek to have the United States delay any redeployment of American troops from the border with North Korea until the nuclear issue was resolved. He also said it was far too early to discuss

economic quarantine measures that would cut off the North's exports of missiles, drugs and counterfeit currency, all of which are widely believed to give the nation a steady supply of hard currency.

But a senior American official, speaking tonight after the 40-minute conversation between the leaders had ended in the Oval Office, said that the issues had not come up directly. Asked if Mr. Roh had sought Mr. Bush's assurance that American force would not be used, the official said, "He didn't ask for it."

He said they did not discuss an embargo, either, though other American officials say the planning for intercepting North Korean ships at sea is now quite advanced.

But before that effort could become effective it would require the participation of Japan, South Korea and, most important, China. Mr. Roh has made it clear that he believes it is too early to consider such a provocative step, which North Korea has called tantamount to war.

"There isn't an on-off switch here," one senior official said tonight, suggesting that the United States and other countries might gradually increase the pressure on North Korea.

This was Mr. Roh's first visit to the United States and an important one to him: he wrote a book about Abraham Lincoln, and Mr. Bush took him on a tour this evening of the Lincoln Bedroom, showing him the White House copy of the Emancipation Proclamation and other Lincoln artifacts. The men then had dinner with members of their cabinets.

The joint statement that the men issued tonight was deliberately vague on the question of when and how pressure could be increased on North Korea.

"While noting that increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps," the statement said, Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh "expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved."

The vague wording reflects the differing approaches to the problem within the two countries. Mr. Roh said in an interview on Monday that any threats to North Korea could scare away investors and undercut the fragile South Korean economy. At a moment when many of the countries' largest conglomerates, known in Korea as chaebol, are in crisis, that is a problem Mr. Roh can ill afford.

Mr. Bush's team, for its part, is deeply divided. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell pushed hard, over the objection of administration hard-liners, to open negotiations with North Korea.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and members of Vice President Dick Cheney's staff have pressed for a much harder line. Mr. Rumsfeld circulated a memorandum several weeks ago seeking an administration strategy to get China to join in an economic embargo intended to bring down Mr. Kim's Communist government. Chinese officials have said they think that would be a disastrous course, leading to instability and a flood of refugees.

Mr. Roh said on Monday that he was coming to Washington "concerned" about the hard-liners in the administration, adding that "many people are concerned that President Bush's 'peaceful resolution' principle may change in the future, despite his assurance otherwise."

But tonight, after meeting Mr. Rumsfeld and then Mr. Bush, he told reporters: "When I left Korea, I had both concerns and hopes in my mind. Now, after having talked to President Bush, I have gotten rid of all my concerns." That statement was viewed as important to the White House, because the administration's first meeting with Mr. Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae Jung, in 2001 was widely considered a diplomatic disaster. The two men split sharply on how to deal with the North, and never re-engaged in serious talks. A rift opened between Mr. Powell and administration hawks that foreshadowed later clashes on Iraq and other issues.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/15/international/asia/15PREX.html>

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Philadelphia Inquirer  
May 15, 2003

## **Locks Are Changed At Nuclear Lab After Keys Vanish**

By Associated Press

LIVERMORE, Calif. - A set of keys that unlock gates and offices at a nuclear-weapons lab disappeared last month, but officials have since changed the most important locks and said that national security was not compromised. The incident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is the latest embarrassment to the University of California, which manages the lab for the Energy Department. It also manages Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

Livermore guards discovered April 17 that the keys were missing. They have yet to be located, lab spokeswoman Susan Houghton said yesterday.

Houghton said there had been no indications of any attempts to access the lab with the missing keys, one of about 200 such sets. For security reasons, she could not say how many locks the missing keys would unlock, but about 100 of the most important ones have been changed, she said.

Lab officials have begun three internal investigations to determine whether the keys were stolen or simply misplaced. The guard who last had the keys says he returned them to a locker when his shift ended April 16. The House Energy and Commerce Committee will ask the Energy Department's inspector general to investigate, committee spokesman Ken Johnson said.

Anyone with the keys would still have to get through other security safeguards, such as electronic key-card locks and computer-controlled access systems.

Nevertheless, "this is an incident I take very seriously," lab director Michael Anastasio said in a statement. "We are reviewing this aggressively and making the necessary improvements to our key handling and storage procedures." Congressional Quarterly first reported the key loss Monday.

<http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/nation/5862983.htm>

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USA Today  
May 16, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Weapons Search Could Take Years

*Official's testimony about Iraq is most pessimistic so far*

By Bill Nichols, USA Today

WASHINGTON — The search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction could take years to complete, a senior Pentagon official told Congress Thursday.

The testimony by Douglas Feith, under secretary of Defense for policy, was the most pessimistic appraisal yet by a top Bush administration official of one of the White House's key justifications for the invasion of Iraq.

"I am confident that we will eventually be able to piece together a fairly complete account of Iraq's WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs — but the process will take months and perhaps years," Feith told the House International Relations Committee.

Feith's comments are the latest and most striking example of a rhetorical shift by the Bush administration on the subject of banned Iraqi weapons, none of which has been found.

"Day by day, the administration is trying to lower the expectation of what they will find, as opposed to before the war, when they were trying to raise expectations day by day," said Jon Wolfsthal, a weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a non-profit organization in Washington.

In the months before the war, administration officials alleged that President Saddam Hussein's regime needed to be removed from power because Iraq had thousands of chemical and biological munitions, many of which could be ready to use within 45 minutes of an order being given.

Some U.S. officials privately criticized chief United Nations arms inspector Hans Blix and his inspection teams for failing to be sufficiently aggressive and failing to find traces of Iraqi weapons. The administration has said U.N. inspectors will have no role in postwar Iraq for the foreseeable future.

But senior officials, including President Bush, now say that though they are confident prewar intelligence estimates will be proven correct, the weapons have been destroyed, moved to another country or are so well concealed by members of Saddam's regime that it will take much longer to find them than originally expected. Feith called the U.S. weapons hunt "a huge undertaking. ... We are in the early stages of this effort. We have found evidence of WMD programs, but we have a long way to go before we can gain a complete understanding of them."

No chemical or biological weapons have been found in Iraq, according to Feith and Lt. Gen. Norman Schwartz, director of operations for the Pentagon's joint staff, who also testified before the committee Thursday.

Tests continue on two trailers that U.S. officials suspect were being used as mobile weapons labs by the Iraqi regime. Feith and Schwartz said no conclusions have been reached about the trailers.

In his appearance before the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell said Iraq had as many as 18 of the labs, any one of which could produce enough biological weapons in a month to kill "thousands upon thousands."

Feith said U.S. forces have searched about 20% of roughly 600 suspected weapons sites.

Pentagon officials say that 110 of 616 suspected sites had been searched, and that the number of people conducting the searches will more than double in coming weeks, to 1,300.

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USA Today  
May 16, 2003  
Pg. 1

## Terrorists' Most Likely Weapon Here? Bombs

By Laura Parker, USA Today

The large-scale emergency drills this week in Seattle and Chicago were designed to teach cities how to respond to two of the most horrifying terrorism scenarios: the explosion of a radioactive "dirty bomb" and the release of a deadly biological agent.

But the drills, many law enforcement and terrorism analysts say, don't reflect the true nature of the terrorist threat to America — and could leave people with an exaggerated view of the likelihood of such attacks and the damage they would cause.

More than a dozen analysts interviewed by USA TODAY say the next terrorist attacks here are far more likely to be like the synchronized car bombings that killed 34 people this week in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Conventional weapons — bombs and guns — are tried and true terrorist tools, easy to get and easy to use. U.S. officials say it's virtually impossible to keep terrorists from getting such weapons, which can kill as many people as would die in most estimates of an attack involving "unconventional" chemical, biological or radiological weapons.

"Yes, al-Qaeda has shown an interest in chemical and biological as well as radiological devices," says Amy Smithson, a terrorism analyst at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a think tank in Washington, D.C., specializing in security matters. "But those are taller technical orders. In the case of terrorist activity, the statistics are stark: It's bombs, bombs, bombs, bombs."

Smithson and other analysts note that from 1998 through 2002, bombs were involved in 87% of the 776 attacks against U.S. interests here and abroad that the State Department classified as terrorism.

And yet, partly because unconventional weapons represent a range of frightening unknowns, their potential use gets more attention. For months, media reports have played up worst-case scenarios as government advisories urged Americans to, among other things, buy plastic and duct tape in case of a chemical or biological attack.

U.S. officials agree that bombs — or hijacked jets used as bombs, as was the case on Sept. 11, 2001 — are the most likely weapons to be used against America.

But officials, pointing to the suicide hijackings and the anthrax attacks that followed, say that no one can be totally sure what al-Qaeda and other terrorists will do next. And so the government, while increasing security at airports and U.S. borders and cracking down on illegal immigration, also is trying to prepare for even the most unlikely types of attacks.

Brian Roehrkasse, spokesman for Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, says Ridge doesn't want Americans "to live in fear" but wants them to be prepared.

"One thing we know about terrorists," Roehrkasse says, "is there is no way to predict what will happen."

With that in mind, the government launched a program to make smallpox vaccines available to health care workers. It is building a new FBI lab at Fort Detrick, Md., to investigate bioterrorism. The drills in Seattle and Chicago involved Hollywood-quality sets and hundreds of "extras" posing as victims.

Preparing for unconventional attacks is important, terrorism analysts acknowledge. They say that unaccounted-for stocks of radioactive material from the former Soviet Union and al-Qaeda's interest in chemical, biological and radiological weapons should be causes for concern.

### Some threats called overblown

But many analysts are concerned by what they see as overblown descriptions — by the media and the government — of the threats that unconventional weapons pose, which the analysts say have perpetuated myths about how serious the risks are.

The critics point in particular to a Homeland Security Department Web site, [www.ready.gov](http://www.ready.gov), and to the U.S. government's rush into, and then retreat from, the smallpox vaccination program.

The ready.gov site has a graphic suggesting that the radioactive fallout from a dirty bomb would cover an area about one-quarter the size of Texas, much to the dismay of scientists who helped prepare the information used on the site.

They say the contaminated area from such a blast — which would probably involve conventional explosives and low-level radioactive material such as medical waste — almost certainly would be much smaller.



Michael Levi, a physicist with the Federation of American Scientists, says he discovered the gulf between perceptions and reality when he helped make a PBS documentary on dirty bombs.

The documentary reported that a blast involving the type of radioactive material that terrorists would be most likely to get could contaminate only a dozen or more city blocks. The only deaths probably would be from the blast itself. It was an alarming scenario that would require a huge environmental cleanup, but it would be far less drastic than what the Homeland Security Web site suggests.

Still, "we got a lot of calls from nuclear experts and they said, 'Are you guys nuts? Why did you do that?'" Levi says, referring to those who thought that viewers might be frightened by any estimates of radioactive contamination. "But we also got calls from our relatives and friends, who said, 'I feel so much better after having seen that.' The experts assume that people are starting with a blank slate. But the reality is they are starting with the assumption that tens of thousands will die."

Many terrorism analysts are more worried about a hijacked jet crashing into a chemical or nuclear power plant than they are about dirty bombs. The threat to people could be far more devastating, and "this country is peppered with those types of plants," Smithson says.

The smallpox vaccination program was launched before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to protect Americans against a disease that was eradicated in the 1970s. The government wanted to inoculate 10 million people, starting with medical personnel, emergency crews and others who would respond first to a biological attack.

But the program, which the government began without indicating whether there was any evidence that terrorists have access to the virus, was met with skepticism. As of May 2, only 35,903 people had volunteered for the shots. Now the program is essentially stalled.

"On the basis of hysterical speculation, we've gone to a great deal of trouble to (provide) smallpox vaccinations for early responders," says Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism chief. "It's clear there was nothing to justify a program of that magnitude."

Roehrkasse says he has not heard any complaints about the ready.gov site. The site had 100 million visits during its first two weeks earlier this year, he says, an indication that Americans were following recommendations to plan for a disaster.

Mike Osterholm, an infectious diseases specialist at the University of Minnesota and an adviser to the Bush administration on bioterrorism, agrees that bombs are the most likely terrorist weapon. But he says other scenarios shouldn't be ignored.

"We are so target-rich," he says. "I can give you a number of off-the-wall scenarios that could be pulled off by a grad student. You don't need al-Qaeda. I worry desperately about wannabes."

### **Scary scenarios since 9/11**

Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have been bombarded with scary scenarios: Terrorists somehow steal highly radioactive spent fuel from a nuclear power plant and manage to create a bomb that spews contamination over a city. A crop duster kills thousands by coating a town in nerve gas. A terrorist infected with smallpox takes a commercial flight to America, infects everyone he comes in contact with and creates an epidemic. Possible? Yes, most terrorism analysts say, but highly unlikely — at least for now.

Besides being difficult to stage, such doomsday attacks would have great potential to expose the culprits to investigators.

They also would require enormous preparation and investment in personnel, money and strategy compared with what's required to use guns or explosives — or a bomb made of fertilizer and fuel. That's what Timothy McVeigh used to kill 168 people at a federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995. It was the deadliest mass slaying in U.S. history before the Sept. 11 attacks, which killed more than 3,000.

For al-Qaeda, orchestrating attacks has long involved easy-to-use weapons, simple plots and precise planning. During the past 20 months, investigators have learned about dozens of terrorist plots from captured al-Qaeda operatives and seized evidence. Nearly all of the plots involved bombs.

A top FBI counterterrorism official says al-Qaeda, the main target of U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, also has worked "feverishly" to develop weapons with nerve agents, cyanide and ricin, a toxin derived from the castor bean that shuts down the respiratory system. In January, six alleged al-Qaeda operatives in London were charged with making ricin. Ricin and a few other biological and chemical agents are relatively easy to produce. But making effective weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands is another matter. Turning agents into dispersible gases is difficult. Some evaporate quickly in open air. Wind and other factors dilute the potency of many agents and render them harmless. The FBI believes al-Qaeda has not figured out how to disperse such agents in a way that would cause mass casualties.

The history of large chemical attacks doesn't ring with success.

In 1995, a Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, released sarin gas in Tokyo's subway after spending millions of dollars on a lab to create a form of the nerve agent that could be dispersed into the air. The attack, in which the cult left containers of liquid sarin on trains, sent more than 5,000 people to hospitals but killed relatively few: 12.

Saddam Hussein had greater success with gas when he killed at least 4,000 Iraqi Kurds in 1987-88. But he did it with his air force, after testing the prevailing winds and using waves of warplanes to drop a mixture of nerve and blister agents, including sarin and mustard gas, on villages.

Angelo Acquista, former medical director of New York City's Office of Emergency Management and the author of a book on surviving terrorist attacks, says the incident in Tokyo showed that terrorists could release a chemical agent, but that to achieve mass casualties, they "practically have to paint it on your skin and force you to breathe it in."

One of the most widely discussed and frightening scenarios for a biological attack involves a smallpox epidemic sparked by terrorists willing to infect themselves with the disease and then contaminate people across the nation. But Smithson suggests that al-Qaeda terrorists, who have proved to be strategic thinkers, would be reluctant to unleash smallpox even if they had it. That's because doing so could expose the rapidly spreading disease to Arab nations with health care systems that are considerably weaker than that of the United States.

"While the release of smallpox would take a devastating toll here in the States and in Western Europe, it would be devastating beyond belief in the Middle East and other developing countries," Smithson says of the disease that for centuries was one of the world's greatest killers. "Why would a terrorist mastermind wipe out all of his potential recruits?"

### **Scientists sometimes surprised**

Of course, analysts aren't always right.

The anthrax-by-mail attacks of 2001, still the only biological assaults in the USA, surprised scientists with their sophistication. The highly refined, spore-filled powder that killed five people defied scientists' predictions that it could not escape from paper envelopes traveling through the U.S. mail system.

The case still has not been solved, but investigators appear to be focused on the notion that the attacks were the work of a domestic terrorist with access to a U.S. government lab and the expertise to mix spores into refined powder. The anthrax attacks showed that although biological attacks are less likely than those involving bombs, the risk is real.

"Somebody's broken the barriers related to anthrax," Osterholm says. "Whoever did that had a very effective bullet, but fired it through an ineffective gun. ... If the same stuff had been sent through an air ventilation system, it would fill an entire building in moments."

### **Guns, bomb materials plentiful**

Still, analysts say, it's easier for terrorists to kill a lot of people — and frighten more — with conventional weapons. There are several million illegal guns and rifles across the nation, easy for almost anyone to buy. The sniper attacks in the Washington, D.C., area last fall dramatically illustrated the fear that one or two gunmen could bring to a city. The Safe Explosives Act, which takes effect May 24, will subject manufacturers, dealers and other handlers of commercial explosives to strict background checks.

But the law does not regulate ammonium nitrate, which is used as a fertilizer by farmers and as an explosive in demolition and commercial blasting. McVeigh's bomb used ammonium nitrate, but the substance isn't necessary to make a devastating bomb. Lawn fertilizer would work, too.

Some analysts believe that the government should put more emphasis on preventing attacks by conventional weapons. That would raise a host of politically volatile issues, such as gun control and even tighter border security.

"If we are going to manage the risk we face ... we have to determine where we are most vulnerable," says Lew Schiliro, former director of the FBI's New York field office.

"We've done an incredible job dismantling al-Qaeda. The bad news is that I have not seen (officials) really address the risk of the lone bomber or gunman."

*Contributing: Kevin Johnson, Toni Locy and Anita Manning*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030516/5164623s.htm>

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Wall Street Journal  
May 16, 2003

## **Iran's Bioweapons Are Fiercer, Tehran Opposition Group Says**

By Michael Schroeder, Staff Reporter Of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON -- Iran has aggressively expanded its biological-arms program and can now deliver deadly agents through weapons systems, according to a group opposed to the nation's fundamentalist government.

Iran's program is focused on the production of weapons-grade anthrax, typhus, smallpox, plague and cholera, said Alireza Jafarzadeh, the U.S. representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an arm of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, or MEK.

"Our sources have confirmed that the Iran regime is capable of delivering biological weapons and inflicting massive casualties," Mr. Jafarzadeh told a news conference here on what he described as a growing danger posed by Tehran's weapons of mass destruction.

"We need to get the attention of the policy makers about the threats of the Iran regime," he said.

The MEK gained credibility this year when it disclosed an Iranian nuclear enrichment program and other weapons production information that was later verified by U.S. officials. The State Department lists the MEK as a terrorist group, while MEK officials say the designation was made to appease Iran's government. The MEK, which has military bases in Iraq, has come under attack by U.S. forces and recently agreed to disarm.

MEK officials said the evidence of Iran's bioweapons activities was gathered in the past several months from informants in Iran, although the group didn't produce documents to support the allegations. The disclosures, if true, could strain diplomatic relations further between the Bush administration and Iran, which Mr. Bush has placed, with Iraq and North Korea, on his "axis of evil."

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said Thursday that the U.S. has reason to believe senior leaders of al Qaeda, the global terrorist organization, are hiding in Iran and strongly suggested that the Iranian government knows of their presence. Secretary of State Colin Powell has referred recently to findings by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has a vigorous nuclear weapons program.

Iran has said its technical programs are used for peaceful purposes to benefit its citizens.

In an attempt to ease relations with the U.S., Iranian President Mohammad Khatami this week in Lebanon condemned Monday's terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia that claimed more than 30 lives, including eight Americans. But Mr. Khatami expressed support for Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group that the U.S. regards as a terrorist organization.

In a recent unclassified report, the Central Intelligence Agency said Iran "already has stockpiled blister, blood and choking agents -- and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them -- which it previously has manufactured." The report also concluded that Iran is "vigorously pursuing programs to produce indigenous weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical and biological -- and their delivery systems."

Soona Samsani, president of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, said that the MEK had received information that the Iranian government is carrying out a plan to consolidate several university biological weapons research and military production programs. The programs were initiated in 1985, during the war with Iraq, when Baghdad used biological and chemical weapons.

Ms. Samsani named the chief scientists and locations of weapons facilities throughout the country and said that Iran plans to increase the number of researchers to 11,000 within a few years, from about 3,000 now. She also claimed that Iran was receiving technical assistance and equipment from China, India, North Korea and Russia.

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Wall Street Journal  
May 16, 2003

## Let Us Inspect Everywhere

By Hans Blix

After Sept. 11, the risk of a further spread of weapons of mass destruction is seen in a new light. There is a fear that terrorist groups or reckless states might launch attacks with such weapons. The United States and its allies have now shown their readiness to deal with the risk through armed action in the case of Iraq. A horribly brutal regime has been eliminated and can no longer reactivate a weapons program -- if there still was one. How are other suspicious cases to be tackled?

First, which are the suspicious cases, and which weapons are we talking about? Listening to the debate one might sometimes get the impression that the world is full of terrorist organizations and rogue states bent on proliferation. The matter is serious enough without such exaggerations. Chemical and biological weapons might be within the reach of terrorists -- whether these are groups or individuals. That risk is taken seriously and there seems to be relatively little problem achieving cooperation between police and financial institutions.

However, the greatest concerns relate to states. The spread of long-range missiles seems to be only somewhat impeded by export controls. As for nuclear weapons, we know that the U.S. and Russia, the UK, France, China, Israel, India and Pakistan have them. We know further that Iraq was developing them and that its capability was eliminated under International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, supervision after the Gulf War. North Korea currently claims it has developed nuclear weapons, while Iran denies it has any ambitions to do so.

If North Korea is not induced to abandon its present course of action, it may create incentives for a further nuclear buildup in East Asia. If Iran were to move toward a nuclear-weapon capability the Middle East situation may be further aggravated.

Clearly, we are no longer where we were only a few years ago, namely, in an almost universally shared effort to write the final chapters of the nuclear nonproliferation book. The U.S. is developing a missile defense, has rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and may be interested in constructing new types of nuclear weapons.

What can be done to resume the remarkably successful efforts that were under way only a few years ago? Nuclear-weapon-free zones had come to extend from Latin America across the whole of Africa to Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. These developments were brought about not through armed actions but through regional and global détente, patient negotiation and the good example of the great powers participating in real disarmament.

The crucial point was always that the foreign and security policies of individual states in the regions, and of the great powers, helped to reduce the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons and to pave the way for a renunciation of them. Security guarantees, including alliances, are among the means of reducing incentives.

It is not hard to see even now that peaceful solutions of the political and security problems in the Middle East, on the Indian subcontinent, and the Korean peninsula probably are the most important elements both to prevent armed conflicts and to tackle the problem of proliferation in these areas. Multilateral assurances to North Korea that it will not be attacked must be a central part of the effort to lead that country away from the possession and export of nuclear materials and missiles. Security Council resolution 687 on Iraq states that disarmament in Iraq constitutes steps toward the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. That thought should not be missed at the present time, when disarmament is being secured in Iraq and the road map for peace is on the table. Steady movement along the map is clearly fundamental not only for peace but also to the eventual freedom from weapons of mass destruction in the whole region, including Iraq, Iran, Israel and Syria.

It has not been questioned that export controls remain important. Effective long-term international on-site inspection similarly remains a vital instrument in the efforts to counter proliferation. Inspection is designed to create confidence among neighbors and in the world by verifying the absence of weapons programs and by deterring such programs through the risk of detection. In open societies, like Japan's and South Korea's, the task is relatively straightforward. The transparency of the societies combined with the international inspection process gives a high degree of confidence. In closed totalitarian societies, like Iraq and North Korea, the task is more difficult.

Inspections in Iraq brought a high degree of confidence that there remained no nuclear-weapon capability and few, if any, SCUD-type missiles. However, despite very far-reaching rights of immediate access to sites, authorities and persons, and despite access to national intelligence and overhead imagery, many years of inspection did not bring confidence that chemical and biological weapons had been eliminated in Iraq. In March, the U.S. gave up on the possibility of attaining adequate and durable assurance on the elimination of proscribed weapons in Iraq through U.N. inspections and instead moved to seek it through armed action.

Does this suggest that international inspection is meaningless in closed societies? No, it can be relied on to verify the absence of the large installations that are likely to be indispensable for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Full guarantees against research and development are hardly attainable and possible hidden stores of biological and chemical weapons may also be very hard to discover. Armed action and occupation can obviously deal with these risks, but these approaches have great costs and problems and the assurance obtained from them is not likely to last forever.

Inspection and long-term monitoring requires patience and persistence, scarce commodities in national and international politics. While it requires support by individual states it is clearly more easily accepted -- and more credible -- if managed by authorities which are independent of the states which assist them, for instance, by providing intelligence. Used in this manner, inspection and long-term monitoring through international organizations could provide an important element in the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere.

In the fields of missiles and biological weapons, there are presently no specialized intergovernmental organizations that could provide inspection in the manner that the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons do in the nuclear and chemical fields. Over the years, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission -- Unmoven -- has acquired much experience in the verification and inspection of biological weapons and missiles as well as chemical weapons -- but only in Iraq. It has scientific cadres who are trained and

could be mobilized for cases other than Iraq. If the Security Council gave it a broader mandate, it could provide the Council with a capability for ad hoc inspections and monitoring, whenever this might be needed in the efforts to prevent proliferation.

*Mr. Blix is executive chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission.*

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USA Today  
May 16, 2003  
Pg. 5

## Cities Absorb Lessons Of Simulated Nightmare

*Terror-response drill a success, Ridge says*

By Fred Bayles, Debbie Howlett and Laura Parker, USA Today

CHICAGO — The 600 firefighters who played themselves in a terrorism drill here Thursday learned a lot about gridlock.

As they raced to respond to the mock collapse of a four-story building and the simulated release of a toxic substance from a chemical plant, they were kept in their trucks for about 20 minutes while officials from other agencies determined whether it was safe for them to enter the hazardous zone.

"We're experiencing some procedural gridlock," said Jay Reardon, chief of the Northbrook, Ill., Fire Department. But Reardon said he was encouraged to learn that firefighters would be kept from rushing into unknown dangers.

"There are benefits in waiting and not being so aggressive," he said.

That was one of the many lessons officials said they learned from the extensive drills staged this week here and in Seattle to improve the nation's ability to respond to simultaneous terrorist attacks.

Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, whose 31/2-month-old department prepared the scripts and financed the \$16 million exercise, flew here Thursday and pronounced the drills a success.

"If we are going to make our responsive systems stronger, we first have to identify our strengths and weaknesses," he said. Ridge declined to cite specific failings uncovered by the exercise. "We're going to put everything under a very critical microscope," he said. "That process begins first thing tomorrow."

In Seattle on Monday, emergency workers scrambled to respond to a simulated detonation of a radiological "dirty bomb." The plot in Chicago was more elaborate. On Tuesday, hundreds of people began showing up at hospitals complaining of flulike symptoms. Officials announced later that a shadowy terrorist group was suspected of releasing batches of pneumonic plague at O'Hare International Airport, at the city's train station and during a hockey game at the United Center arena.

The staged disasters multiplied Thursday with the building collapse, the chemical release and a simulated collision at Midway Airport of a Boeing 737 and a medical helicopter. The Midway drill was an exercise the city performs every three years; it was timed to be part of the terrorism drill. The day concluded with a "raid" on a suspected bioweapons laboratory.

"The city has performed well under extremely difficult circumstances it was presented with the past couple of days," Ridge said.

But some experts on terrorism said the drills were too scripted and not realistic enough to expose weaknesses in the nation's emergency response network.

"It is not helpful to design something that works," said Matthew Lippman, a criminal justice professor at the University of Chicago who teaches a course on terrorism. "If you want to see what the problem is, you have to find out what doesn't work."

He said the biological attack portrayed in the drill could kill many more people than the 2,000 deaths scripted. That level of sudden death would create chaos across the city, not orderly lines of people seeking treatment, he said.

But officials in both Seattle and Chicago said the exercises taught them lessons they had not anticipated.

Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels said he encountered a stumbling point when trying to decide how to advise the public about the degree of radiation contamination in the city.

In a real dirty bomb attack, residents would have to be told whether to evacuate or stay inside. Nickels said he found himself staring at documents about radiation that were all but impossible to decipher.

"What I got were these maps that had these big green blobs on them with these mathematical models," he said. "I was pushing the health folks to give me something in English. We ended up improvising, calling on some local folks to give me an example. They said, 'This area would be the equivalent to having half a dental X-ray.' "

That was a description Nickels said he could communicate to the public.

Seattle has had more time than Chicago to assess challenges raised by the drills:

\*How does the city deal with downtown commuters who have been told to temporarily stay inside their office buildings? When it's safe for them to leave, does bus traffic resume? Which roads are open? Who decides when to reopen a bridge connecting downtown to a neighborhood across the bay when the city owns the bridge and the state owns the access ramps?

\*How does the city control public fear about radiation?

\*How should contaminated water, used to wash radiation residue off victims and rescue workers, be disposed of?

Nickels said there are limits to how realistic a drill can be.

"You can't spring this on a city" without advance notice, he said. "You would cause panic. But it was fairly realistic. I did feel adrenaline at times. It did put you in a place where you were thinking through these decisions very carefully."

*Contributing: Bayles and Howard reported from Chicago. Parker reported from Washington, D.C. Contributing: Chris Woodyard and Tom Kenworthy in Seattle*

<http://www.usatoday.com/usatoday/20030516/5165130s.htm>

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Los Angeles Times

May 16, 2003

## Regents Wary Of Bid On Job

*Some say rivals might hold an edge for the Los Alamos contract.*

By Rebecca Trounson, Times Staff Writer

SAN FRANCISCO — University of California regents voiced concern Thursday over the university's ability to compete effectively in a future bidding process to run the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Some asked whether the university should even try to continue to operate the nuclear weapons lab in New Mexico.

The regents, who were holding their bimonthly meeting here, weighed in on the issue for the first time since the Department of Energy announced last month that it will require the university to compete for the contract to run the lab when its current deal expires in 2005.

UC has held an exclusive contract to operate Los Alamos for the federal government for 60 years, but Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham decided that the university must bear responsibility for recent management failures and other problems, including theft.

At the meeting, Linton Brooks, administrator of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the lab, urged the university's leaders to compete for the contract.

Brooks, who co-wrote the critical report that led to Abraham's decision, said it should not be viewed as a repudiation and praised UC's recent efforts to overhaul its business practices at the lab.

"I think the university should compete," Brooks said. That UC does so, he said, "is in the national security interests of the United States."

But several regents asked whether the playing field would truly be level, with other institutions, including the University of Texas, rumored to enjoy greater political standing with the Bush administration.

Brooks said that although he could not assure the regents that politics would have no influence, "it is a decision that will be made on the merits."

<http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-alamos16may16.1.2177571.story>

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